The Prosecutor’s Contribution to Wrongful Convictions by Gershman, Bennett L.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2014
The Prosecutor’s Contribution to Wrongful
Convictions
Bennett L. Gershman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, bgershman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Contribution to Wrongful Convictions, in Examining Wrongful Convictions: Stepping Back,
Moving Forward 109 (Allison D. Redlich et al., eds. 2014), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/962/.
chapter Seven 
The Prosecutor's Contribution to 
Wrongful Convictions 
Bennett 1. Gershman, Pace University 
Introduction 
I\. prosecutor is viewed by the public as <1 powerful law enforcement official who:;e re-
sponsibility is to convict guilty people of crimes. But nut evcT}!body understands tJJat 3 
prosecutor" function is Jlot only to win convictions of law-hrea ker~ . A prosecutor is a 
quasi-judicial official who has a duty to promote justice 10 the entire cummllility, including 
those people ch~Lrged with crimes. lndeed, a ll overriding function of;) prosec lltor is to 
ensure that innocent people do nol get onvicted and punished. The Supreme Court 
observed in the famous passage in RerxC"r v. United Slales (1935) that a I!fLlse !.Itpr' dll e1 ] 
responsibility is that "guilt shall not escape or innocen e suffi r" (p. 8). 
Despite t]w heavy burd('n placed on prosecutors to ensure tbat justice is allurdcd to 
nil accllsed, empirical and anecdotal evidence strongly demonstrates thal prosecutur·-
by overt misconduct, exercise of bad judgment, or ~irnrlc carelc:$,~l1e ~- have been 
responsible for G1L1sing the convicLiom o{hundreds, perh'lps thollsands, of illDocen t 
persons. The media regulady reporl stori~ of innocent iJl:nph.: being rcIea'ed afte r ·rending 
many ye;Hs in prison ti.n;] crillle tlll:Y did Ilot commit. I[n Illany Ill' th(:se in ~ l ,lnc(:S, then· 
is powerful eviJence tll;] llhe wrongrul (lnvictil>i1 \\',15 attriuutable dire ·,Iy, or iod irellly, 
lo errors or miscollduct by prosecutors. According to the N,llioll.ll Registry of Ex()rwral i.(lll~ 
(,IS of September, :~ o 13), I , J 62 d efenJant ~ ill I h.: u..'). h~vc beell exonerated sine(' 19WJ, 
<Iu d: rrQ~e lIto rial OlisCOJ1uU t ba~ been;) signiJlcant factor ill Illore ihan one-third of 
Lhese erroneuus cUllvictions. 
Il shuuld he intuitively obvioL'ls that given the preeminent role played ny' the pro~(Ultor 
in the U.S. criminal justice system, the he<lvi ' :it responsihility for ' nsuring thal only guilty 
pt' nplc: :l[e convicted lies wiLh the prose utor. rvll)l·e 'tnan allY l>ther gowrtlJl1CnL official, a 
prosecutor i->0~sesst:S tlJe gr('alest power to lilke away a pl'rsull\ liberty, reputation, ;1l1d eV~11 
a per 'on" life. The irresponsibk use of this puwer, n noted above, (an nave Lrrwi rc~uJts. 
A prosec u tor is constilutionally ~nd cthic.dly mandated In proll1otl· j l1 tice. The 
prosecutor is even considerccl a " Millst(;r of justic:c" who 11:1'; a cOl1 stitutional, slatulor , 
and cthi I d lily til c n~urc tll,lt a dercndallt is convi Ie I Oil till: hasis of rci i;l ht.: viJcl1l:c 
in prol~eeJin t',.~ th,lt are biro Ncvc:ri.hde · , oml' pro:c lllC)r~ dev iale from the. e ruk~ ;Ind 
eng, ge in conLilId th,l l di~t()r\..'; the l~c' - findiilg process 'Imll'l(ldlICc.'!:> crn IlWOU $ L.Oi1vj( liOi1" . 
Indeed, if ;1 prmecutor is motivated to i'.ca l(1ll sly win a COllvictiol1 by \l ny Jl1e;l il,,) dlld 
ell rage. in wndud lb ,lt ~· ith \! r intentionall}, 01' clreiessly undcrillin '~ lh ~· lIllt:g rily of the 
[" cl-nlldin g I'rocess , lhe prme 'Lllor i, eSG1pahly will hring abulil the convi - l ion o[ ,\ 
dcl«llcl ,ll1t I\lho is actu::tlly in n) 'en I. 
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Stepping Back: A Brief Historical Perspective 
ProS(Tuiors historicall}' have e.'ercised eno rl11 ous power with v ry lilll oversight or ;j 
(nuntJbiJit), over the use of that ,Jo\\'<:r. The ahsell .C o ( signi fiCl llt checks h,15 r('a t d bro;ld 
opportunities .l~'r abuse. .onllllcntalo)"s havc rnulinly bemoalled lil , rr qUCllCY, Ild n, grail y 
of misconducl by I'fOSCClllOJ--;. Dean RO$ () Pound ( 1930) morc th, 11 t:.ight)' ),t:a r < go dccried 
th "numher o f new trials for gravc misconducl o f the pllbl i prose L tnr" and the U;jbusc and 
disrega rd of forensic propriety whi(h threatens to become Ihe ~ ta pl " in American prosecul ions" 
(p. 187). The Icgal Jjterature over lhc years has ontained titi e~ such a, "Improper ,untlu I 
of Prosecuting Attorlleys,""Rel11d,ks of l'rosecut ing At WrI1 C)f as PrC'j lltiici, I Error," "Appea ls 
to Ra e Prejudice by Counsel in Criminal Cases," and ", haLl Pros ·culor Concc<11 FacL ." 
The most ramous cillcul11cntati()11 of misclllldlld hy l'rLl~(y ul() rs W;l~ ,'(llllaincd in the 
1\):~ 1 Report by the National COlllmission on Law Ob 'crVJn e , n I Enforcemenl, popularly 
known as the Wickersham COlllllli sion, which s)'~rcl1l a tiG1L1 y docu mcnted wides pread 
abuses by U.S. prosecutors aud tilC ;ldversc impact 0 Ihe misconduct on the administrat ion 
of crimjnaJ justice. Examlles or lhe m iscOllduct col11miltcd by prosecutor ' , ;lIld the c 11 -
sequences to the f~lir administraL i n of ju. tic , are descr ibed in the ~e -tions below. Pcrhap 
the most serious ClJllsequel1cc of rhe mi "conduct, a curdi ng LO the l'j'on, i. "the com'ic i 11 
of the innocent." 
Indeed, the: qucstion ar the time ur 1J1 C Rq)()rl, ;H1d thcrcan l' r as 1.0 wh t' thl'r inl1oc,'lil t 
persons were convicted of crimes W,lS neil'her abstr ilct nor hYPOlhe tical. The welJ-knuwn 
study by Professor Edwin M. Borchard (19,2), C OnlJict7J1g the IIIJlOCellt , docul11ellted sixty-
five cases of convictions of innocent der~ndants drawn (rom a nlllcb larger number of 
erroneo us crim inal convictions of inr1oc'nt people. The most prominent callsC" of 
errone llS convictions, Borchard found, and this is similar to the tindings tuciay, were 
mistaken identificatiuns and witness perjury. 
Moreover, there i. Ilillie doubt that the Supreme Court's lo:llTIow, <I rli cul,ltion of the 
prosecutor's special obli,gation [0 ~1l5L1rC Ihat "justlc!' shaH bt' done" ill lhe JY 35 B..;}ger 
decision was inL1uenccd by then-Canon 5 of the Ca nons of Profess ional Elh ics o( the 
American Bar AssQcjation (1 908), which stated: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged 
ill publ'i c proseculion is nol to convict, uut to see that jlJS Licc is dOlle. The su ppression 
of facts or the secreting of wi tll esse.~ capable 0 f est,l bl ish i rig the i nnnccnce of the accused 
is highly reprehensible." NevertJ1clcss, despi r legal and ethica l nonns dl!.~igncd to en~Cl uri1 g(' 
prosecutors to purslle justice rather thall CO ll\riction , cmpi.ri 'al stuJies 'ince 1935 have 
documented serious and pervasive mi~collduc l by prm;c ul or:-. And whi le our LS have 
contill l1.cci to bemoan their inability [0 make pro eelltofs play by lhe ruk", 't here i. Jittle 
evidence that courts, lawmakers, or pro ressi()n~d d isci plinary hodies have d 'rnon~lrat cd 
a vvillingness or cap<lcity LO impose sanctions 0 11 proseclltoh for CO l11l11illing misconduCt. 
Significance of a Prosecutor's Mental Culpability 
l i r~ llt III :lllal )l7. ing th ' nnture, ' [ent, and re,I $Cl Il fo r ~ I proscclI tor\ wr Ilgflll o r [lcg , ": til 
(olldul:l, it i often unclea r Wlll:th r a ~H'O S .::1 lto r i:, l1l o ti va ted bv a gaud f. litil d es l r~ I 
. \\'1 11 ' 
'onvict a perso ll the prosecutor h JI1esl'ly he li e ve.~ is glJiit " M:l bad 1:1ith des ire \0 ' 0 1.' 
cCllviclio ll a l all CO/its rcgardlcs;; or whether th '.' d '( 'wlant io a.; tuall ! guilt y. lJ)'( ) c~.ltt(LiI. 
often argue that cvell if Ilw y may have devi aled from a ru le , Lhe violation was no t \" 111 \/ ti ll 
but attributable to mistake, inadvcrtence. or Lh e pI" ~ lIre or the trial. 'ourts II 'liel , 
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.]ddres~ whether ;1 proseclIto r's violali n Ill' !I rule was ddiiJcr,ll ' ur inadvertent; nor 
JlOI'::~Llrts typicall}' ask whether a pru ccutur was motiva ted to bri ng ahout the conviction 
d~ a per. un who m lhc pr()~c utn r belicved !TIn I have hl:Cll inllOCl.'nt. These questions 
~'IJJlQS l aJwa '. n.r ' in at:able l)~ reo (JIUl ion, Fi rsl, I ryillg to ,divine it prnsecutllr';~ ~IJtenl 1)1" 
olival ion IS vlrlually' I !TI11osslble, Morcl )vcr, sed Illg I .. !.ilscovcr a prU5ccutor S III kilt to 
111 ' . 1 I' d 'f.' hi' . - . 1 19a9c in 11lISCOIli..JlIct, orlcr JIl I I Tenet' to t e trllt I, IS III lad IlTe ~~ val1l. 1\5 one court 
Clllt it, "ll hurl:> the dl:fendant jmt .IS mucil In have pre.jud.icial blasts come (rom the 
;rurrlpet of the angc.l C.lbriL'J" ([j llilcd S/II/n 1'. Nettl. J 941, p, lJ30), 
It is also noteworth}, Ih ~11 <l prosecutor's conduct in causing ;'l n innocent person to be 
convicted does not require <l Gnding th;]l lilt;; proscl:utUl: engaged in any Illjs..:onduct. 
:-;olll(' vini<ltions, as noted below, haw a consic]nable bearing on whether an innocent 
:lefenJant may be ound guilt>,. Tl be sure, conduct that distorts Ihe fact-findjng I ro(.c~s 
and lIlilnipularcs the L ct-finder':; ev,1l1l3lion uf tbt' proof freql1cntly play' a sign.ificClnt 
role in Ii'll' convicl ian of lUI inn!. (l'lll person. But even ,dlscnt allY Wl'\)l1gflil cunduct, a 
prO!(eClI tor's condu..:;L nl<lY Will ribn te to an ' rroneous COil jel ion merely by the prosecutor's 
failure \.0 scrutinize cardllUy the l.juality of his prouf and to examine closely the reliability 
(lnd credibility of his wilnc's es. Thus. even absent wrongful conduct, a prosecutur lD<ly 
be exercising poor judgment in allowing a tenuous case to go forward to trial. Lndeed, if 
,I prosecutor after closely examining his proof is not morally cC'rtJin of a dcfend<Ult's gwlt, 
Ihen the prosecutor hilS abdic.ltec'l his resrunsibility to protect innocent persons from 
being wrongfully co nvicted Jnd punished. 
Wilh respect to .1 pm<;eclItor'::. rnilldst:'t in prl'paring to go to t.rial, every proSt'culur 
probably believes (hat thl' Jcfl'nc1alll i~ guilty and probably has as~ell1hl~d wbat he 
bd icV('s 10 be s urfil~ie)11 l'vidence to prove the defendant's guilt. Howcwr, it. is not 
unusual thelt given (1n illll~ ll~ive investigation ot a C:lse, there Illay be evidence i.n the 
proseculiOIl or police ~iJc s thaI contradic t the defendant's guilt, or at least ra ises a 
signific;lIlt dl,ubt. nnw should a prosecutor view Ihis colltradictory proof? Studies show 
Ihat a prosecuto r predisposcd ttl believe. in the deft::ndant's guilt and sCl:ki.ng to win a 
cOllv i -lillll may [it,d, view I.Dntr.ldidl.lry evidence as fal<;e. irrdevant, Or llnrcl,iable, 
and certainly not sufficient to C(1l1Sl' tUt' I'rO,\el:utor to rethink the tlll:nry or prosecution 
or cause the prosecutor to h.:siwtc tu t~lk the case to tri,t!. Expert.s in cognitive psycilology 
maintain that prosecutors ordinarily make profess ioll'll decisions ba 'cd on Lheir personal 
beliefs, values, and incentives, :lUd these psych llogical forces may kad .I prosecutor to 
make dec isions, even unilltcnliull,ally, that ,In' inconsist.:nt with fJ[omoting justice 
(Findley & Scott, 2006). Thes ,:, luLii's q Ll!:stion whether prosecutors arc able 10 maintain 
the neutrality and objectivitr thelt i~ ncl'Cied to Ijf'1t<:Cl inllo<.:ent [l~rS(lnS agaill st a 
wrol1gful prosecution, and su gesl' Ihal Lhese psychological bi es impede ratioDa'! 
dec ision -making. 
A prosecutor seeking to win a COllviLlic I) is likel y 10 l)vL'restinwte the strength o f her 
case and underestimate the probative valu E' l lf evidence that contradicts or undermines 
her case. For example, studi e~ show that too Ill. n}' pro~eclJt()rs exhibit a so-called "tunnel 
vision" whereby they ignore 01' di, miss evidence that IHight cl,Jlltradict rhe tldendan t' 
guilt (Ba nd es, 2006 ); <1 "c lIlii rllJ.lli o n hias" lhal r ·Jits c'vide ll ce that co nfirms th ' 
prosecution's theory and discounl ;; 'vidl: ncl' thaI cOllt radicts tll .1t Lhe ry ([3urkt' . :W(6 ) ; 
"seJective informatiol1 proc5sillg" tita l \wi ::- hs cvi<il'1I e Ihal suppurt. Olle':; belief mon.: 
heavily than evidence thal ontradiCl~ IIl!)se belier; "belief pcrseverance" Ihal de cribe~ n 
I'endency to adhere to one's c ho~cn theory evcn thllugh Ilew evidence cnme' t light lh ,1[ 
completely undercuts that tJleory\ evidcnti (l ry b. sis; . Ild "avoidance ognitive Li: 'onHllce" 
under which a person tel1(h 10 .I Iju t her beli ,rs 10 -onlorm to her behavior. 
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Impairing the Integrity of the Fact-Finding Process 
The proseaHor d l!llin:lIc$ 111(" (.'1 I-findin .... prC)ce ' ill several \WI}'I1. Fir: I , the prose ut or 
hal>. vinuall1lonopoly or the pron r. superior;t ceo S 10 and kno\.y l cdg~ of the facls rh,ll 
nrc.: I1 sed [0 Oll,,;c t'j l ~ endanl , and rhe :1bi lity 10 shape Jnd pr en t III c rad s tn the 
f<lc i-li ndcr in lhe 111 0s1 persua!iive way. To be sure, as a legal and () lhical mailer a prosecutor 
must h .. vc con fi dence in the reliabili L' f his cvidc.nce 0(:1"01'(: bringing cil:1rgc$, and hefore 
prescJ) ling the evidence 10 a jur y. TlQ\vever, as noted ab 'Ie , a pmsecu t r typically j 
con fi den t in the accuracy o f his evidence, whether or not that confiden i juslified. 
Moreover, as the reprc e nialivc of the government, the' pro. e utor before the ju ry i 
loaked wit h considerable pr~ tigc and re peel, and therefo re has a unique p wer to alIt: t 
a jury' evaluatiOIl or the ract~. Juries ma~' view lhe prosecli lOr as a "Champioll oj" rusti e," 
a heroic fIgure I· 110 ca n bl: t rust.ed to ll. c the fact and make argu men t. in fair and rc-
spon illl" man ne r. 
Th· types of neluel' by prosecuto rs tha t con tribute to wrongful co nvi rion usuall ), 
fi t inlO several wcll-rL:cognized categories. The), in c/ude conceaJing evi dence that may 
prove a d efendant's innocence, presenting evidence of all id ntifiCiltioll wiulcss thaI i 
unreliable, eliciting testimo llY from a.n accomplice, i.nfo rmant, or jailhouse "sn itch" tJ1al 
i f'3lse, oO'ering testimony by a po li e \ itne.s that is false and inaccura le. prcse ll tillg 
test imony in child sc.xu;il ahuse as lha \. is unt rut h (ul or exagg ra ted, and pre.s<.'nt.ing 
sciC'nliJi evidence tha r is fraudul en t or erroneou . 
T he foil wing cclions describe ~xalflpl c.s f mi_conc1uct by prosecutor lil. t eli tOri 
the fact-fll1(ung procc~s an d interfere with l.he jury's ability to dt:cide a cnse fa irly anu 
{:l ti flll ;.llly. 
Pl'(l~€'culor~' suppres'S'io n of f;JvornMe cI'idence, A p rosecutor's failure to disdo I: 
favorabl evidence to U1C de fense that may either ~\"Clll pate a defendant or undcrmiJH~ 
the tru lbfld ncs or reliabili ty ( pro 'ccllLion I\'i.fne se is one o f th ~ leading cau es of 
wroflgfuI convictions ( ;!r relt, ~O I I ). Under the' landmark case of Brady v. Maryland 
(1963), a prosecllt r's failu re to disclose favoI;ab le evidt'nce that is ITHl lcri, I to y-u il l or 
PU ll ; hrneIH, rega rdless f the reason, and reg.lrdlcss of the prosecutor's good or bad 
fai t h , viola les due process. The kiJlds of proof that are principa l b ... ;es for wrongful con-
vic tio ns - er roneous yewilness idc.lltificati(Il%, cooperation deals wi lh witn cs e So and 
fl awed scientific evi de nce - often havc been suppressed by p rosecutors a nd only mall)' 
years later have been d iscovered. For cxa ll1p le, after <1 11 exoneratio n based on D A 
("vidence, j( may be revealed that the identily of (he reaJ perpetrator was known 10 the 
police fro m the beginning bUl never di . c1o st:d LO the defendant. T he U.S. Su pr '~c 
COllrt ha:, ruled in sever;11 c(lses that prosecutors were guillY of u ppn.:ssi ng rn~It:1l 31 
e vi den ce , , nJ if is reaso nall y d ear in ome of the' , ca es th at the defe nd a nt I" ;\~ 
wl'Ongfullr conv icted. . d 
II is difficu lt to esLimate the nllmber of defendants who have been wrongfully conv1c;le 
cause o f <l prose ulor's suppression of xculpatory evidence. It appears thal apa rt fro m 
err r. Id. Ling lo in OmpdCn[ defense: counsel, the most frequcnt basis for wrongful co~~ 
\fictjons ha been pr J cculorial suppression of ;(culpal ryevidence. Acco rding to OIl'! 
~tud)'. ut of 133 know n exoncr<llions that resulted !.I I a wrillcn dl i ion bJ' a co~LI'I, ,(1 , 
dcfendanl~ , ()r jusl vcr 10(11\" . ulted in relic ba tl li n a vi'Jlation of Hmriy (L"lrr"'cr 
200R).A study of all exone ra lion in Mas~achu elL> ~h()ws tha J 2 o f 33 case., or ( .1 
36%, involved a Brad)' viola tion (Fisher. 2002) . :IIi! 
. I ' . ak . 'd'r; ' I I - I cln1l11• uses II1VO 'lIng nHsl ' en eyewl lness t e.n1J 1 < lion iJrl: per HIP~ r 1e f1l0~ . If ;111 
example of the im p.lci f it prosecutor's viola tion o f Hmrly o n the con"j .l! ()~l ( lll,l! 
innocen t pe.rs n. Suppn::ssed evidence hy lhe pro .. cclIlor sh owing thal tJl!~ WJlilc " 
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I,' been Illisl;lk ~1 ran lTes (rom ev~denc~ tl~a~ ~be ~)~Iic illit!ally suspecled a,nother person 
I'Iill ' littcd Ihe erl111e, Iu ;111 eycwltncss s 1J)lllall'aiJurc to Idenllfy the defendant, Lo an 
L<1I11111 I :ss's JJosilive i lentilication of 'omeolle else 'I~ the perpetrator. MO'I recelltly. in 
'\\" I .. ' " c.Y~ . " I', Cll ill (_01 1 ). Ihe. uprem~ Curt rever 't:d a 1l1111der com'i '[ion b -caU $C Lhe 
",jlJI j I' t'fi ' I' I I I ' , . . II 
" t: LItoI' s l1~p rcssc ( a po Ice 0 'ICeI' IIOlc ' r vca IIlg 11,lt tll' 011 yeycwllnc$ Illltia y 
\11 1('jS [he police that he ould not identify :tlly or the pcrpelralnr , lid nul sec their fa cs. to [ I h'f I 'h" J "wQuld not mow t em I , le saw tern . 
,111 suppression of c;xculpalTlI'Y scic!ltific evidencc ha~ r<.:sluted in the conviction of innocent 
ersOns, For c 'ample, in the widely reported '](:xas case of l'vlich, e.I Morton, an infloceD t ~an vlho was wrongfully convicted or murderi.ng his wife in 1987 and who spent 26 
,(' aI'S in prison, the prosecution ~ upprcssed evidellce of a bloody halldana discovered 
i,chind h i:; home on I'he clay of the murder which contained DNA t.hal would have 
ex.cluded J\l!0rtoo <1ll(1 ideot itied the real killer. tn COllnick v, TI't/III/'SOIl (1011), ,I \ .. 'Tongl'lll 
conviction ()f murder in which the defendant spent 18 yein ' in prison, the pro. (' ulion 
failed to disclose to the defcnse that a scienti..6c analysis of;] piece of the vic ri m', dorhing 
stained with U1C perpetrator's blood showed that il did not mJlch the blood type of Lhe 
J.:Jenda n t. 
Suppression of evidence that could be used to impeach prosecution wilnesses is com-
monplace. Prosecutors are nOlorious for failing to disclose immunity deals with key 
witnesses that would suggest to a facl-Gnder that the w,itness W;l$ giving {,list: or misleading 
tcslimollY as a quid pro qUI) (Garrett, 2011). Proseculors have f~lile.d 10 reveal th.;]t a 
witness':; in<'riminating testimony came about only after [IIi: \Vitncs,~ \V'IS hypnotized, 
Prosecutors also have failed to disclose recorded s tatem~IILS of key witJlCSS~ indicating 
that they planned to frame the defendan t. 
Proserutors' lise of unrdiablc testimony. Some witnesses are indispensable lo secure 
convictions of guilty persons, slIdl as eyt:witnt's.o,cs, children, cooperating witn 's e , 
and scientific experts. By the same l'Clkcn, however, these witnesses .Irl~ nOLorious lor 
skewing the fact -finding process and causing erroneOLIs conviLtiolls, nol nec '~.')ar ,ily 
because of a pro secutor's mi:;conducl', but because a proscl:uLor has not carefully velled 
the witness's story, Too often polic , aJld pl'o~ecl1t[)rs intl'l'view lhese witn e:! ses wilh in · 
sufficient attention to details, contradictions, and inconsisknc:ies. i'vlon.:ov r, Lh ese 
witnesses may be unusually vulnenblc to coercive or suggestive interviewing technique', 
It is often unclear whether these wil'oes5l'$ have .1l.tuaUy been "coar heJ" t I r. ivc a Faist..' 
or exaggerated account of tbe event, or through sllbtle. intcrviewillg l, >'chniqucs have 
shaped their stories to accord with wl,al they hdil'W Ihl' police and pro 'C 'utOL. wallt 
to hear. 
Identification witnesses. Identification witnesses are among the most lJllldinhle wiLn c.s. 
Misidentification is the sing.le largest sow (' of e[for ill wrongful couviclion ;1ses (Garrett, 
20 Il). Many prosecutors do nol appreciate the dangers nswciakd with eyewitnesscs, and 
the difficulties as.sociated wirh reLrieving a witness's memory of Lin evenl and reconstructing 
that memory. Prosecutors in intl'rvicwing such witnesse and prql,lring 111('1l) lor IC~lil)'il'1g 
may assist the witness in rCIllemlJt'ring lite event LHIU retrieving a truthful re-collcction. 
But a prosecutor's actions illso rn,, )" JiSluri a witl1 t ::;'. IInderlying m Il'IlJr}, anJ pr(lduc~' 
a false recollection, A pro ' clltor in prepa ri.l1g .111 cycwi lIIC: -':. lestimony hol~ lhe ability 
to influence a witness to rcmelrrber file ' and fill in gaps thai I1Hly be inaccurate. bUI which 
the witness may come to belicvc art' the tfllth. lVioreover, h 'GlU'ie of th e proseLlIlor' 
special statllS, he is often viewed by the witness as an exp l:rl who is highly kll1.1WleJgcilbic 
of the facts, and will use the facts responsibly. lndeed, some witnesses ma}' l'ven lr )' t 
shape their stories to wh at they believe may accord with the prosecutor's expectat ions, 
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Sonll' pnhl'llllors nl~ly evcll allcillpt to ;1dill~1 Iii,' lL'~timony of eyewitnesses to strengthen 
illl' ill1fl,I11 1)1 Iheir icklllifl,:ati'lll, ,1Illl an CITOIWOU-; conviction. For example, in Kyles v. 
Whit"';' IIY'}'i) a clpiLd Illurder nl~l', the pwscculor presented testimony from the kq 
l')lc\Villll'~" \vh,) gavl' al1l'xtrcmeiy ,!t:t.lilcd accounl of the killing. However, ill a statemenl 
the Willll'~S gave 10 the police \horlly afLl'l' thl' killing, thl' witness gave a vastly differel11 
illU'lIllt of Llw crilile (which the f1rn~<.:(uli()n nC'vc! disclosed to the defense), stating h( 
Jid not SC ' lb -' a tuaJ kil Ling, nor did he rC lll ember many of the details that he testifiec 
to at trial, Th e Supreme C Llrl reversed the conviction based on the prosecutor'~ 
nnndisclo . ,IIlT, but implied that Lh c witness's account had been "adjusted" by the proseclltol 
I;Jr the tr ial, ;uld thatthc l.l rnsccutor had "coached" the witness's new story. Other instance~ 
of eyewitness memory adjustments by prosecutors reasonably lend themselves to procurin§ 
wrongful convictions. 
Child witnesses. The testimony of child witnesses is especially vulnerable te 
manipulation by prosecutors. A familiar instance i. the testimony of'yollng childrl'n in 
sexual abuse cases. Indeed, numerous insta'llces (lrWrongrul (ol1vic!iom ar at trihlltaul t 
t·o the It:~ tiln () n)' of l'1il d witn essc~ (Garrell, 20 11 '), Courts have incrcasin gly cC rtllinizcd 
the testimony or ynUIl' childrell fo r coercive or suggest ive conduci by inlerviewers in 
preparing these witne SlCS for trial. l~o r example, ill Idaho II. ·Wright ( 1990), the, upremc 
,ourt fund tlwt a chi.ld 's accw;a tion or sexual abuse was based 00 leading and suggestive 
qm:sti ll n ing by an in rc rrogator who had a preconceived idea of what the child should 
be disclosing. 
Prosecutors in seeking a conviction may present the testimony of children without 
sufficient scrutiny of the truth of their stories and the techniques used to elicit their 
testimony. Prosecutors have often failed to c.lrefuliy I.)robe tht: accuracy of the accounts 
of child witnesses, and have not been su ffic iently ,lttcn tive to f,lcto r!> that m ight shed 
li ght llU the trLlthflllnc~s of the cbild'~ acco unt, slich as the absence of spontanellUs 
rccl lI, til e bias of tJ 'I e interviewer, tbe lISC of leading questions, multiple interviews, 
in ct:ssa nt questiolling, vilificati()n of the defendant, ongoing contact with pCt' rs anol 
references to th eir .. tatcments, and th e use of Ihreats, bribes, ;1I1c1 Clj oling. Courts h~ vc 
also critici!.cd the pros 'cLltor's failure to videotape or otherwise record the initial interview 
session. 
Cooperating witnesses. Cooperating witnesses are prouably the most dangernus 
prosecution witness of all. No other wiluess has such an extraordillar)' incentive to lie, 
No other witness has the capacity to Illaoipulate, mislead, and deceive law enforcement 
officials. No other witness is capable of lying 1.0 l'QlwinciJlgl,y and yd he believed by the 
jury. \A/rongfld cOllvictions are replete with illstances i.n which cooperalillg \-vit!1csses gal'>: 
blsc testimull), tlMt was crilicallo the verdi.cls (Carlcll, 2011). 
A prmeclltor has <I powerful incentive to ~l'ek Ollt and accept a coOl'erall.lr'~ aCCLJlI II I. 
ullcntically. Moreover, as Iloted ,lbovc, a prosecutor often bas a predetermined view or 
Ihe fad'S of a Case tlwt may inhibit Lile proseclltor from scrutinizing the cooperator's nccOUil: 
objectively. If a prosecutor has a theory of the case that has been dev >lopecl i'rnlil othL:1 
evidence, or from the opinions of the investigators, the Pro~cLutor is more apt III ac[e!·~t 
the ,;onperMor's vlT~ ioll uncriticClLiy. If Lilc cooperato r d ·'viatcs (rom th~ pros 'cntor\ Iheol ).' 
till.: 1)i1.)~l·(lIlor may (lIll Ilide th;]t the C )operator is lyin " 0 1' withholding infuri1latlu.II, .,( 
(:ooperal )1', ;11'" Illanipulalivc pe ople, a nd thc:.i r testi mony may in piliI' ill<' illtcgrltr:l 
the CK t- fi nci ing 11roces to su ch " deg ree Ihat innocent pl'I' O il !; arc caughl. ill tilt' \\'C tlill!~ 
the oopc rator', li es. $ Olll <; PI' , e u to rs have i:l minJsettil,ll se rving jllstice 111(: ;111'; I'U~<)I]l:' 
p ·'or! in jail and may tend to r -Iy heavily (In the cooper,l tor 's ac O Ulll. Moreover'l ~o-
. . 'lC 1 1C prosecutors ilr~' e, dy maillpulated by coopel l1 tors, ,)lId therefore du not exam ll .11 or 
' . ,; tel l , 
opcraLOr'f, <.1 CO illll objc·· tively. If ;) p ro~ecLll(lr negl ecl to probe a coopcral nl ,5 . 
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'rOll ud !>uffi cien tl)' 10 lll.1((1VlT inconsi$lencics or oUlright lies, [hell Ill\: c()opc t'alor\ l"l l~g lIlY \lWv be 11erjurv, and hdp f)roduce <1 11 lInjusL conviction. Also, Sllme C,TII)j>Cl'ators 
'SUIIll I ' • • • 
Ie. 0 1 even know Lhi.' clJfrcrenc' between Imlll ;lI1d lIllti'lIlh, and il prose utor who 1mb JlI:ly 11 , . • " • 
. Ilcllsively probe thl' cooperatur s story inVites false testImony. oopcrators often come 
~ 11'1 environments uf crime and deceit that may make an I.Illllas tauding 01- truLll 
r ~iguoliS. Cooperators Ina), not have a prosecutor's concern with exact facts, and may 
~I:e langunge in a loose and I~()o-\jteral fashion that encourages them to make exaggerated 
,.;scrtiOns that they may believe ,Ire the truth. 
; . Scientific aNd forellSic experts. Prosecutors' use. and misuse. of scientific evidence has 
lJecn one of lh princ.ipal causes of wrongful convicLilJns, particularly in death penalty 
.:d5es (Garrett, 2011). Proseclltor!> may present ·- through I he testimony of an expert 
\vit.JIes.~ whom the proseclltor claims to be trustworthY-i1n opinjon linking the defendant 
til the nime, when in fact the proof may be erroneous t1l' rraudulent. Pro ecutors ill 
many cases have concealed from the defense evidence that would have discredited the 
<,xpert's opinion, and distorted ljle evidence to make il appear reliable, orten with tragic 
resulrs. Pros\,:cUl'ors have elicited fraudulent lestimony, erroneous ilnd prejudicial 
cOJlclusions without any tactual basis, and opinions that ~1ppear to b~' LlCIseu on a valid 
scientific theory hut are really the eXj)ert's speculation alld conjecture. Tbey also bave 
attempted to bolster the expert's credibility by exaggerating Lile expeds b<lckground and 
l'xpcrieJJce, and by givUlg the jury person.ll assurances that tbe expert is n~:dible and 
reliable. 
Prosecutors know that juries ordinarily view experts with heightened respect, J\1d give 
considerable weight to their opi.nions. In contr~1st with other rypes of witnesses, the expcrl 
is usually viewed by the jury with all aura of speci,ll reliahiUty <lnd lrustw()rlhine:,~. 
Moreover, the expert usually posse ses impressive crc(knliuls that reinforce Ihe jury's trusl 
in Ihe expert's upiniol1. Furtber, the expert is usually Cllil:l't al presenLing hi.-; or her 
t~~ti111ony skiUfuUy aDd persuasively, and in Jangurlgc UHiI illJ'()r,~ C<if1 undnst<llld. [7inall)" 
Ihe t'xpcr[\ conclusions almost always interlock with oLher evidl'nce ill the C3se and 
reinforce and cllrroborate the pro ecutjon's theory lli' guilt. More than any other witness, 
the expert probably has the gre,ltest capacity to mislead the jury. And in tandem with a 
prosecutor who aggressively seeks a conviction. tile experl «'ill provide the testimony that 
virtually secures that conviction. 
Fraudulent and erroneous sciel1tifi~' evidl'nce h,,~ ill(\uJ{'d JillWTpril1t~ plarJl('d at tile 
scene of the crime, faked autopsies in death pcnairy cases, r: Iricalecl breathalyzcr readings 
in intoxicated driving cases, and perjured testimony hy l"\perts making hair and blo J 
comparisons. Prosecutors b,IVe also presenled as lrustworthy the tcst imony of scienlific 
experts that contained false, exaggerated, and erroneous conciu::.inns t hat lacked a scknti.J1c 
basis. Numerous instances of so-called "junk science" have been presented by prosecutors 
as reliable and used to win cOllvictions. Some of these pseudo-experts are notorious for 
promoting bogus opinions. 
Moreover. because of the secretive nature of pre-trinl prep<l ration, the £11.111111':1' in which 
a prosecutor is able to sh 'lpc, m:mipul,It.:, ,lnt! even manu f;lctlirc the e. pl.!rt 's testill10ny 
is virtually impossible lo provc. h is intuitively obvious, huwcvl'r, that the re lati()l1 ~hip 
between prosecutors alld [Iwir expcrt~, i~ Illlltlwily rein fo rcing of"L<:lI \lot in I.h t: :.c-r vil. ur 
truth but to win a conviction . M<1J1Y experts display J pro-pro t: lI1iOIl bias, l'spe ·i:1 11 
those employed by law enror 'ment ag(:llci('~ ( ,innlH:lli, 1 ~97) . Many of Ihc5 ex!-'crt 
are notorious for manUl,lLtlll'illg t · ~ tillll>ll}" to fit the rroseclltion's theory ) f guilt. fj the 
same token. prosecutors routinely seck \,lUl t.:x!-'erl , who will support the prosecution's 
theory of guilt, and reject t:J\ rt.:r!~. who lIIighl di) I,lar Ilwre independence (Faigman, et 
a!., 2002) . 
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Manipulating the Jury's Decision-Making 
A PnlsL"cul.m has J spccial Ju fy not to mislead the r,lll-filldcrl)r atll'lllfti III 111, 111 ipul ::l It' 
a jury's lIllilily In review the tvidcncc fairly and di~,p;b~i,)J1,lll'ly. T II\' ollPllll lll1il y ror a 
pro~ccutor 10 Illi,l 'fi t! th ' Inct-finde.r <lnd manipulate the wrdi t inh eres ill virl u;11I 'tV T )' 
ph'lSl' of the "rin)i11all fi., l. Misleading cOllduct can even rise to th e level of a dill' pro es, 
vi o latioll whcn it illvolve:; the knowing U$L' of false evidence, or when the prosecutor's 
( nJHluc t rcnders the tri al hll1dalllellt,liJy untilir. The risk that an innocent pCl"son lDay be 
convicted because of such tacli 's iIS evidenl. 
False, misleading, and inflammatory tactics. Th.t· 1-'/"I)~\~Clltllr '~ delih!'r HI' lI'.( of'I'c)"ju)"cl! 
testimony violates due process, Illay reslIlt ill an unfair trial, and may ev .. ~11 re.sult in Ihe 
conviction of .Ill inllocent perSt1l1. [v('n non-deliberak COlltil.l C: t. Lh,ll clicit, j1<.'rjurct/ 
testimony is a due process violation if lhe prosecutor shOl~d have known about thl" perjury. 
A proscculor also commits misconduct when she uses fraudulenl physic !1 evicience O[ 
creates false impressions frum the evidence, such as asking qucst ion, wilhout ~ factuill 
basis, or insinuating that the defendant has a criminal background and a propensity to 
l:OII111UI crimes. 
A prosecutor also undermines the integrity of the trial and risks convicting an innocent 
per~o n by refUTing to matters outside the record and misrepresenting the record. Thus, 
cllmb have I"l!huked prO$Ixutors and in some cases reversed convictions for allusions to 
private conversations with witnesses or the defendant; references to evidence that had been 
excluded; insinuations that issues of fact have previously been authoritatively determined; 
or comments that dilute reasonilble doubt and the presumption of innocence. 
Prosecutors can also misreplesent the record by making false or exaggerated claims 
that can mislead the jUl"y into convicting. In the well-known case of Miller v. Pate (1967), 
a prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by misrepresenting in a rape and murder 
trial that undershorts belonging to the defendant were stained with the young victim's 
blood, when the prosecutor well knew that the stains were paint. Prosecutors have also 
made false assertions that an object in the defendant's possession was the murder weapon, 
that the defendant's fingerprints were found at the crime scene, and that the defendant 
failed an intoxication test. 
In addition, appeals by prosecutors to a jury's fears, passion., and prejudices arc.l 
common tactic to manipulate the fact-finder and may produce all enoncelUS vcr<JiLt~ Such 
conduct often appears deliberately calculated to impair a dcrend~lI1t's I iglll to a filLr trial. 
For example, prosecutors have introduced inflammatory physi(,;1 evidence, have e./icitcd 
inflammatory testimony contaiuing irrelevant racial ,md sexual innuendos, ,lnJ have 
engaged in other inOanlln;ltory conduct designed to prejudi ce the jury. 
Prosecutors are forbidden L(1 use arguments calculated to infh1l11l: t he pa s si()J1~ ;llld 
prejudice of the jury. However, they also know that such arguments are much more 
effective than restrained and objective remarks, and some may be willi ng l(1 ;lSsulllC Ihe 
risk that an appellate court will find the conduct not severe en ougb to warr,ult a reV r~;l~ 
when the remarks are viewed in black and white in the appeLlate record. Thus, proscclit r.> 
usc a litany Ilr <.;ulurFul and ahusive rh"tnric tn denigrate th ' dc(elld:l lll. ami s me ( Our ts 
give the prOst~culnr collsirJ..:rabk latitlldt' in sllch c1iSIJ.Jf3ging c.ommC/lt~. Pro~eculOr al '~ 
make argullll"llb calculated to incit, dl110 n g juror::. feelings or Ie, r, :I nge l", :lIId rcvc Jlg~I ' 
r· rS (1 Exhortations to join the War on Crime. predictio lls oj" Ihl" di re Lo nse'l li ence5 i )11J"lJ· t' 
I' " Cl not convict, and exploitation. or the jury's sYIllj1ath (()r the victi m to Ill cil' fce I Jl~~ ;I)1 
anger and retaliation can sufficiently inflame a jury to r sull in th e nllvi lIO Il 0 
innocent person. 
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. c.'tltors lise otheJ' tactics to jnila1l1t', SUd1 ;1' in~il1ll<lljng tiJ :H th ddclld,11l1 h, s 
pro~ L ' . . , . " . • , " 
, krcJ, thre:1 tencd, and bnhcd pOlentlal WI tJ1C. SC;; , Appeals It) ~l Jury s [.>rcJL1dll't~ ~ nd 
IlltJI~O;YI·~e.; ;1I~(1 may llndcrmjllL! lhl' aCCULILY of a verdict. such as app('als La rac.i;il, 
,1l'1' , [ I I I "I 'Il I I I 
' , laJ religlOlls, qelH cr, Wt\1 t I, :lrlt ratnol.ic )1:1 . CS , .-l'OScc.utors an a SIJ ill,1 (C otlcr 
na lll )) , L, " , , • , 
. "U1Tlcnts Ihal can [l1Is1c<1d a Jury IIlto O)JlVIL'tlllg ~L.lch, : Onllllcnts un <I dclclIcianl s '~IITure 10 rcst'i/y. call witnesses, and engage in other c nstitulionally protecled d<:: tivity. 
;;~n311Y, i:I proseculOJCan mislead the jury whell ~he Illakt:s fI pcr 'onal cndors<:ment of the 
,:rl'ng th ( f Ihe case, the credibility of witnesses, and the defendant's guilt. 
s u~t"a.ir attacks on defendant's chara(:tcr. Prosecutors in mOllY of the GI,SCS in which 
innocent persons wCre wrongfully convicted soughl to prejudice the jury' a 'sessment of 
fhe evidence hy <1 tfacking tbe dctendant:~ cilarJCler. This tactic uSllal.lyworks, Tbe prejudio<ll 
imp,ICI of a defendant's criminal or :>ordid ba.:kgrounJ on a jury can be devastating. 
Studies show Ilwt when a defendant's criminal record is known and the prosecution' case 
is weak, the chances of acquillal Me far less !ikely (I--:.uVCll & b:isel, 1%6), Prosecutors 
arC well aware of the prejudicial effect on jurors, and even though courts attempt to 
con flue such evidence to a proper purpose, prosecutors often find ways to expose a 
defendant's bad character to the jury. 
For eXJmpk, prosecutors in cross-examining a defendant might use a defendant's 
criminal rcc(lrd not for [he propl!l' purpose of showing untruthfulness but to insinuate 
guilt hy suggesting a predisposilil)ll 10 c(~mmit aime-', Prosecutors violate rules regulating 
cross-examination by inclucijng inflammatory delails in Iheir questjons, especially when 
the prior cri111es arc for violent ads, or by portr:1ying rhe defen dant as a dangerous, 
sinjstcr, or undesirable person, How("vcr, i!' a defcml,l11t docs not take the witness sland, 
a prosecutor is forbidden to introduce evidence of the defendant's criminal record. 
Prosecutors use a variety of tactics to circumvent Ihis prohibi":ion by iJ1tro,luc:ing evidence 
that the defendant used aliases, was pictured in 1)()li e "mug shots;' had po]jc crimiual 
identification numbers signifying a prior arrc:;l, am:llhrough other ways lilat depict tbe 
defendant as a sinister char~lcter. Proseculors dls~ try tl) prove a defend, nt's guilt by 
showing that the defendant may have ;1S. ciatcd with other cl' ,minals and courts sometimes 
have reversed convictions because or lhis lildic. 
Unfair attempts to bolster credibility. A pru~cclltor Gin mi·;!tJd 0 jury into giving a 
witness's testimony greater believability uy JJ'rific ially inllating till' nt'Jihility of that 
witness before it has been atlatked, This technique is referred to ,IS holslering, and its 
lise may obstruct a juror's nllionaJ analysis of the blot;, ,uHlthc witne '. clTlJjbility, and 
potentially resuJt in an erroneQUS \" rd.ict. Prmcclltur~ dl) not know whether a witness 
is giving truthful testimony, yt:l they nlig.lil either l'xprl's~ly or impliedly assure jurors 
thaI a witness is telling the I ruth, The pers,lO:J1 endorseme nl of a witness's credibility by 
a prosecutor is improper, nr.st, beci1ll.~e of the cx;1itcd posltioll a ,prosecutor occupies in 
the eyes of the jury and the weight a juror Illa}' giVl' to rill: pwseClllnr\ assurances, and 
second, because it may create the impr ~s ion thai the l'rus(;clItor possesses other 
information outside the record of the trial that supports l!he aS~l'rtiuli that the witness 
is telling the truth, 
Prosecutors also subvert this <l llli-ilo,lc!! tCI'il1 )5 rule by eliciting testimony frolll wilrH,: ,,>ses, 
particularly expert's, to endor~L' or v,t1id,lll' the credibility of other witne.:;~e. , wh ) m:1 
be victims or eyewitnesses , The danger, \) LO llr'7c, is th:1t jurors often rely heavily on Ille 
testimony of experts, Thus, if an expert offers an opinion that valicl~llc:~ .J I\·it LI es '. 
truthfulness, or implicitly endorses the witness's truthfulness Ily ~ lIgges ljng Ihal tilL' wi tntss 
is a member of a class of persons who are trustworthy, or 'ls~ertilJg li rec tly that thl' C01l\-
plainant has in filct been victimized, the jury may give that witnl'~s ':, lcs tilllllllY "ddl'd 
weight. Appellate courts monitor this practice, anel convictions in child sexu:11 abuse, 
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domestic violence, rape, and drug prosecutions have been reversed because of improper 
l( 'SLilliollial int r ft: rell hy cXI,crh. 
Prose u!(lr~ L'Il1pl(l)' m ller tact ics 10 l'llh,tllCe a witn es \ n cdibilily. Pro:ecutors have 
,lltelllptcd to bolotcr the credibility of" p(l 'liu: on, crs by luillting to rlw'lrd~ for heroism; 
rclcrrillg !n wi tnl'_~~C'$ sLlccessfull }, pa, ing d polygr,II,lI lCSl; clicilill ' te, tjlllllllY 1",lt an informant 
h,, ~ ,dwCl , hC'cn lruth ful; sugge.~ ti.Jlg Ihat ;1 co()I'CraLioll i1 'rCCITlCnl with ,I wil rl e::.s was prepared 
only ;lfter the prosecutor believed the wit ness; giving th ' jury t he misleading impression that 
the 1 1 r(l ~ecu lor i~ il1ollit(lring the coopera ting witnes~ to make sLire he tells the truth; deliberately 
illtn lei uci Ill; i natl.rll is. iblc and prcjud iei:l l hC<1J ~ay to !iLlPpOrl a wi tne."s' testimony; manipulating 
:-I wit Ilcss's invQcal ion o/" a privilege; instr llctillg a prosecution witn ' :iS to testify while holding 
a Bihle; and having a child wiLnes$ sit 011 tilL' pro ecutor's la p while testifying. 
Moving Forward 
As we have seen, prosecutors by overt misconduct or the failure to scrutinize with 
sufficient care tbe quality of their evidence and the reliability of their witnesses do in fact 
contribute to the conviction of innocent persons. Assuming, quite properly, that prosecutors 
seek to avoid such miscarri"g('~ 0" jllstice, what ac"lion,," (an prosecutors take to prevent 
the conviction of an innocent pl'r~on~ TI1l're a1 .. ' ~l'VC:1 ,II ways that prosecutors' offices can 
reduce the risk that an innocent I'erson will be LllllviCleel. 
First, prosecutors' offices sit, ukl irnplclll III ongoing education and training programs 
that identi~r the best praCli e~ to insur' against wrongful convictions. Such programs should 
emphasize the best practi es for interviewing, aSSe sing, and presenting in COLirt the testimony 
of the kinds of witlll:SScS who have been most responsiblc for erronfO Ll~ (J1IlVictions-q','-
witnesses, children, cooperalor.~, ,HId expens, This I' raining might l(l(U5 Ull i%ues suell, ;l S 
problcm~ or misidentifica tion, bow to deal with inconsistL'nl and cOIltradictory slatement, 
how to evaluate alternative perpetrator evidencc, Itow to deal with 1.I11Ch'l rged crimindl 
conduct, how to deal with drug, al ohol, or medical issl.ll~s Lhat might interfere with a 
witness's accurate accounting, and any jlias or intcrQ;t til I lui:' witness may have. 
Education and training should ell1pha:.i7.c colllplianct.: wit h J~rrldy I'. A411ryllilld (I %J) 
and Ciglio I', United Stllt('~ r ]972), including the lise of d lecklist s to review Ilhe various 
typcs or ('vidcnce that need 10 be do~cly scrlltinized for possihle- exculpaLury anel 
impeachment infurmation, :;Udl as prior inconsistent- statements, cooperarjon (l!C'Teemcnt" , 
cri.l1lillal backgruwld evidence, ,lilt! ('vidence bearing on <l witness's motive to lie, l'ro . ;ccutprs' 
offices should also be trained on working with police lepartmen s and individual police 
officers who might be in possession of info rmation titaL \l) n), need to be eli closed to U1C 
defense. Some police officer might Dot hL' aware or their con. titLlti~)\lal oblig,ltions u.ndl:r 
Brady-Giglio, and pruwclllnr~ slwuld he traiJlt.:d tp assist the f10li e in understanding til,'lr 
constitutional obligations arrd ca rrying OUI 1Il'ir Juties properly and ('frectiv.:!,y. 
Second, prosecntors' offi ces should adopt I)oli les to enhance thL' rcli.l\)ility ur the fill i ' 
e. d' 0 I I' IdL , ." -I " I'·· 'yS}lstt'1l1 un IIlg process. ne suc '1 po ICY wuu )C tn l1l,wllalJl an open II; L' l. J, dJvel · ., 
whereby the entire file of a case is rout inely maJe "vailahl to the defense wf ll i n adva~ll ~ 
of trial. Under such an open- fi le ''1'proar h, Inatcri;d" lhal , re "("ili ""H I 1"0 c1crellsc dl'Ct~ V~r);. 
in -lu diJlg a li~l l( l I"llS :cution witnesses, statements of lh (;~c wiLnesses, slimmll l"l~S (lc 
- . . 1 " kl~l1) 
slalem ·nts Illade by WIlIt ('$Ses, and rl'ievtl lltl'oll c repo rts, ore turned VCI" to L II c. Ihe 
early ill th ~ ease. Moreovcr, an 01)('11 fil l.; policy th "L disclose. every relevan l itelll Iii i\l!~ 
p roseLL1ti~ln'. a e li) lbe defense may o(Lel" a belle r cbance o f lh prosecutor co rn p')~ _I;, 
with his 13mdy-C; iglio disclosure obligation than a more restri ctive disCtJVcry 'If) prc. 
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I 'cd, by using .In open file Lii ' overy system, a pro~eclltol would not have to assume 
Illl""k (If making <I m istake in eva luating the llIateri;ILit), or certain evidence. Under an 
Iht:' :I'~iiL' poli 'y, lhc evidence would be Li i, ' losec1 rcga rJle:;s Ill' materiality, Additionally, 
oP( I'C.I1 tile sy,lelll would prote I the illtcgrily of th ' f, roe ' S$ in the event a new prosecutor 
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, 110 J1lJy be llnlanll Itll' Wit t 1e eVlt CJlc:e ellters t 1C CIS' atll' nec s to ma e a re atIve y 
;uick decision on whether to take a pica, go to trial, or seek ,I dismissal. Finally, an open 
~Ie discovCfY policy would _enhance a prosecutor':; rcputation for transparency and fairness, 
,InJ fl)ster in judges ;md delense lawyers a sense nf trusl lind reduce occasions for contentious 
discuvery litigatinn. 
Third, proseculors' officcs should also crcate dalabases for identifying and tracking 
Hrad)' and Giglio int(.)rmation relating to key witlll'SSl:> ~lI(h as informants, police, and 
exrerts who may have testified for the govemmenl in the pelst and may testify in future 
CHses. For example, if .I prosecutor intellds tu call a$ :J witness a I oLice officer, Lhl~ prnseLlltor 
could enter his name in the dat.1base, locate previuus cas ." ill which he lllay have testilJed, 
or previous i.nvestigations in which he may haw been involved, to sec if he has been cited 
for false or erroneous testimony, or ot.her qL1estiDn;]ble conduct. The same.:: type of vetting 
(<Juld be done with informallts, e:qwrl witnessL'~, ;lud virtuaily allY otba witness, illcluding 
even eyewitnesses, Indecl, slllllc'yewitnesscs have te,tined in several Jit'ferent and 
unrelated prosccut'ions, raising :;erious questions ,1100111 thl'ir reliability. 
Fourth, pro ecutur J offices should staL)lish progr,llll~ to investigate post-conviction 
Jaims of actual innocl:l1ce. Indeed, ~ e Vl'ral pr cCLltnrs' Ilffi rers have created "Conviction 
Integrity Units" or "Second -Look" bureaus to inve · tig~lte $uch daims nf actu;,tI innocence 
in doseJ cases. The creation of these bureall s is consistent with a prosecutor's ethical duty 
to "do justice." Pro(edml'~ ,-(lllid be "slablishcd l , I sses ~ 1.Iaillls critically based on the kinds 
of allegations made, For inslancc, claims with :;tlollg inJicia of ;I clual innocencc might 
be given illvc$tigHtivc priority, \l1(;h ;1\ claims of rnisid,'ntillcatioll, perjur)' by iuLonnallls 
and cooperator., witne.~s rCTantatinn,-; , and allegatiol1s () newly discovered ·'vidence. The 
stl1udarJ 1(1\' reviewing Llaims uf Jctll;d in l10 cncc sit )uld lIo l be unduly restrictive, but 
should allow for flexibility in deciding which case to invcstigale, e.';l'ecially where a cbilll 
is made Ihal is plausible and (OlItaillS specil)c facLual alkgaliurls tbal GH1 be investigated, 
f illally, 10 rednce I he risk (If' wrongful convictions pr eClltors ::hould cslubli. h pr t ) (J~ 
with pnlice d ' P,IrtmellI III beco me involved in Ih· investicralion earlier to :lssist police ill 
protecting lhe in tegrity 01 the illV('.\tjgalinn from mistake ', 'l'cciaUy constitutitlllaimisiak .. 
l)rosecutor should work with ]lolic,' departments to establish training and educa tion 
programs in the areas that an: Illost often iled as GlllSC' for wrongful onviCliuns - false: 
confessions, use of informanls, and Bn.lcly and C,'iglio disclosure vioJation~. lndecd, s ince 
Brady violations occur when policc t~lil tn lis 10:;(' exclIlpator)' in fnrmalioll to prosecutors, 
il is imporlant for prosecLitl rs 10 cducalc poli -e () Il the nalure of nrmf,V informatio11 and 
lhe irnpOrlanc ' or dis losing stich inlorlllatiol1, r'rnscclitors Cl)lLhl ,d~() .;dUC8k pllli~l' 011 
hest pracl"ices for vi'Jeotaping COlli -iull' , ;l1ld usi.lI g identificalion procedurcs to 1"'l"Okcl 
.Igain,sl misici cl1tili c;llion, ~lI (h , s duuhl -blind lin 'ups, whcrc the (lfiic(' r (','nJl1C1ing till' 
,1!iIlClIP due~ Ilot know th e iclelllit)! Of lh ·' Lisped, ~IIIJ :;t: [llentiallinel1ps, in which persons 
3re presented to Ill' wjlll ' ~~ nnc ;11;1 lime rather Ihan all <.It once, 
Conclusion 
Prosecutors have a cOllstitutiol1<ll and ethical obligation to ensure that innocent people 
do not get punished. A prosecutor is a minister of justice with virtwlily unlimited discretion 
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III d1:Jrg ' " pc r~'i ll wilh a crillll'. and a 1\'lIcalc ft r thai f\er.~on's conviction , nd punishmcnt. 
,(\~ Ihe lllllnhc.r 01 'xo ner:lIed d 'fcnda nts conlinl1c~ to 'mw, however, it bccol11' il1 crc,lsillbl), 
ck~r Ihal pro~ecul or . eilh t:1 b I ;]flirlll<lLivc aC1s of llliscondu -l, or il faillu'c 10 carefully 
and rcspnn ihl)' . crul inize Ill ' qU:Jlit), or till' C idcnce, ~Ol11 e tillle do 'o ntrihUiC 10 
d"fcmbllt 'wnlll:.'rul cn llviclilln~. 
Hnw 'vcr, reining in prn.seculorial 'xc 's~es lital f'roduc(' wrollgful cOl1vi ti on, i a 
di(fi -LIlt 1ask. ProSt'CllIOl'. rypicllily believe that lei"cndants ;.Jn~ guilty, and ~Igg ress i vc l )' 
~cl'k to convi ncejuric to relurn 'uilty vcrdit:l.-;. Most prosecutors would probahl }1 clai.m 
lhal the}' lle V'r cOllv icted al1 innocenl pers n. l3ul sU'h a cla im i no t surprisin O'. S1u c.i.it: 
show th<lt <l prnsecutclr's pnson:dily and mjncisel may lead him or her to ciiscount 'vidence 
slI pporLing the derendant's innocell ce as erroneOllS or unreliabk. This allitudc of denial 
"imply rein(or(c~ the possibility Lhat a prose nor may pLlJ'~lle a conviction against an 
innoccnt person t'V('1l though sub~lalltial evido..:n 'c poinls awa~' from guil!. Ulllcs~ l-'rosccutors 
be:Wl11C more scnsit ive to the perilous siLuaLion facing dcfenLi;:mt5 who arc actu,]Jly inn ent. 
and to the: kinds of dangerou' willlcsses and cl lllbiguous t'viclenn' that have been [t:.~po ll.sihlr 
for producing miscarriages of justice, and unless Ihey arc able to discipline Ihemse.lves tf) 
be skeptical and open-minded regarding the sufficiency of the prouf, IhL' likelihood is 
that many more innocent pe pic roulinely wiU be convicted. 
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